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Arbitrage, Uncertainty and the New Ethos of Capitalism 
  
Abstract 
This paper examines the arbitrageur as a figure who both embodies the new ethos of 
uncertainty central to ‘financialised’ capitalism, and exemplifies the issues of ethics 
and innovation raised by those who now personify what Weber called the ‘devotion to 
the calling of making money’. We begin by providing a brief background to financial 
‘abstraction’ in the economy, and the issues of dissimulation with which this has been 
associated, before suggesting that engaging creatively with Weber’s writings can help 
us identify uncertainty as key to the character of contemporary financial decision-
making. It is against this background that we analyse the arbitrageur as an ideal-type 
personality who embodies a newly abstract approach to capitalism. This approach is 
frequently portrayed as unethical, but we suggest it can be associated with an ethics of 
managing the unknown through an innovative commitment to overcoming limits that 
has consequences for human life in general.  
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Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2007-08 plunged the world’s major economies into a prolonged 
recession that is generally considered to have been the worst economic downturn 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Assessments of the contributory factors that 
led to it identify various phenomena, but a common focus across many studies is the 
central role played by the development of increasingly complex trading instruments 
such as ‘derivatives’, ‘futures’ and ‘collateralised-debt obligations’ within a broader 
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‘financialisation’ of mature capitalist economies (Prechel and Morris, 2010; 
Deutschmann, 2011; Czarniawska, 2012; Dawling and Harvie, 2014). From this 
perspective, it was the explosion of financial trading, facilitated by a multiplicity of 
innovative instruments, that led to market distortions, irrational and irresponsible 
speculation, and the destabilisation of productive economies (Knorr Cetina and Preda, 
2005: 3; Epstein, 2005: 4; Stiglitz, 2009: 353). Despite the implication of such 
developments in the financial crisis, however, it is now widely accepted that their 
growth and significance continues, necessitating further analyses of their nature and 
implications rather than simply adding to post-hoc rationalisations of ‘what went 
wrong’ in 2007-8 (Bryan and Rafferty, 2014). 
 Existing accounts of ‘financialisation’ display considerable diversity in their 
analytical orientations and focus, but tend to agree on the central features of this 
phenomenon. The term ‘financial’ signals activities relating to the provision or 
transfer of liquid capital for profit, while ‘financialisation’ refers to the accrual of 
profits through such activities rather than through the production and trade of goods 
and commodities (Krippner, 2005: 174-5). Furthermore, while processes akin to 
financialisation have a much longer, and more uneven, history than is often 
acknowledged (Braudel, 1992), there is now a common view that financialisation 
represents a systemic transformation of mature capitalist economies. This 
transformation is portrayed as a ‘regime of accumulation’ centred on the creative 
exploitation of opportunities for profit generated by financial instruments themselves, 
rather than investments in ‘tangible assets’ (van der Zwan, 2014: 99, 103; Engelen, 
2008: 118).   
 While diverse forms of trading are facilitated by these developments they are 
prototypically embodied in arbitrage. Arbitrage is commonly defined in finance 
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textbooks as ‘locking in a profit by simultaneously entering into transactions in two or 
more markets’ (Hull, 1997: 14). In its considerably more complex contemporary 
form, however, this practice draws on the information-generating power of trading 
rooms to create potential profits by creating associations between similar or related 
dimensions of diverse securities across a number of markets (Beunza and Stark, 2002: 
6; Miyazaki, 2007: 397). Since this involves deconstructing and reconstructing 
economic phenomena into forms that can be bought and sold, and, as such, is 
arguably unconcerned with the specifics of material production, arbitrage is often held 
to represent a potent demonstration of the ‘footloose and flexible’ exploitation of 
global financial flows for profit (Bryan and Rafferty, 2014; Tosacano, 2014).  
Indeed, the significance of arbitrage is such that contemporary financialised 
capitalism is often referred to as ‘arbitrage capitalism’ (Alvater, 1998: 593; 2005: 6; 
Merino, Mayper and Tolleson, 2010: 774; Tabb, 2012: 10), and many of the ills of 
financialisation attributed to it. It is judged to have been central to the 
institutionalisation of deceit and fraud in the types of trade implicated in the 2007-08 
crisis, for example, and to represent a broader pattern of financial obfuscation, tax 
evasion and deception masquerading as innovation (Stiglitz, 2009: 346-7, 353; 
Archer, 2012: 35; see Widen, 2012; Farlow, 2013). Even in popular culture, through 
films such as Margin Call (2011) and Arbitrage (2012), this type of trading has been 
associated with the deceitful (if not always illegal) trade of financial products known 
to be worthless by those selling them.  
While there may be a broad consensus on financialised capitalism’s central 
features and its embodiment in arbitrage, however, contemporary studies frequently 
exhibit a one-sided focus on its structural dimensions. This is evident in explorations 
of issues such as the macro-level shift in the sector structure of the economy and its 
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effect on the distribution of national income, meso-level shifts in corporate 
governance, and micro-level developments in credit-financed consumerism and 
middle-class investment practices (Deutschmann, 2011: 352; see Krippner, 2005; 
Epstein, 2005; Lapavitsas, 2011; Walby, 2013). A similarly structural focus is evident 
in neo-Keynesian critiques of financialisation centred on the ‘regulatory failure’ of 
states to manage the ‘efficient’ operation of capitalism in the interests of broader 
social and economic order (Toscano, 2014; Granter and Tischer, 2014; Bechert, 1996; 
Minsky, 2008; see Keynes, 1965), and neo-Marxist critiques of financialisation as an 
intensification of the class-based structural operation of the capitalist mode of 
production (Arrighi, 2010; Henry, 2012; Monaghan and O’Flynn, 2012). 
As valuable as these structurally focused analyses are, they frequently gloss 
over transformations in culture, or reduce these to a neo-liberal facilitation of 
individual and corporate greed, predation and deceit (Partnoy, 2003). In so doing, 
they occlude reflection on the degree to which cultural and structural changes may 
impact upon each other, adding complexity and uncertainty to agents’ negotiation of 
economic challenges and opportunities (Archer, 2012). Within accounts of regulatory 
failure, for example, the reduction of issues of culture to the dogmatic ‘market 
fundamentalism’ of neo-liberalism displaces reflection on how states, confined to 
territorial borders in contrast to the increasingly global mobility of financial market 
actors, resemble ‘vendors to’ rather than ‘governors of’ a corporate and financial 
clientele (Ehrenreich, 2009:191; Stiglitz, 2009: 346-7, 353; see Davis, 2009: 171; 
Deutschmann, 2011: 361). Similarly, neo-Marxist approaches that assume a 
hegemonic culture of ‘mass deception’ emergent from inequalities in the ownership of 
the means of production seem ill-equipped to comprehend either the development of 
phenomena such as derivatives, which tend to involve ‘ownership of exposure to the 
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performance of means of production, not necessarily ownership of the means of 
production themselves’, or the motives and mentalities of those who trade them for a 
living (Monaghan and O’Flynn, 2012: 370; Bryan and Rafferty, 2014: 890-2).  
In contrast, we suggest that reflection on the structural features of 
contemporary capitalism needs to be supplemented by analysis of its cultural ethos, or 
character, in comparison to that dominant in its earlier forms. This directs attention to 
the ideas and types of action central to economic activity, and to the value of re-
engaging with those classical theorists for whom the essential character of capitalism 
was a recurring theme. Marx himself was concerned with the ideational dynamism of 
capitalism, for example, in contrast to some of his neo-Marxist successors who 
focused exclusively on its structure (Harvey, 2010: 13). Schumpeter’s (1975: 82-3) 
emphasis on ‘creative destruction’ as ‘the essential’ character of capitalism also 
focuses on the ethos of this economic system in terms of its impulse towards 
innovation; an impulse that ‘revolutionises the economic structure from within, 
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one’.  
The advantage of focusing on financialisation through this cultural lens is that 
it enables us to assess what the current era has in common with, and how it differs 
from, earlier patterns of economic decision-making within capitalism. Yet Marx and 
Schumpeter are not the only classical theorists of relevance to this approach. Several 
contemporary analyses have illuminated current transformations in the economic 
ethos by reassessing what Weber (1992) called the ‘spirit of capitalism’ (Castells, 
1996; Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005; Sennett, 2006; Rose, 2007a; Appadurai, 2012; 
Lee, 2013). It is this literature that we seek to develop by engaging creatively with 
Weber’s analysis of the role of uncertainty for the motivation of action in capitalism, 
and his suggestion that the character of an economy can require people to develop a 
  6 
worldly calling and a particular personality type if they are to survive and flourish 
within its parameters.  
This approach can, we suggest, cast fresh light on the ethical substratum 
underpinning financialised capitalism today – a substratum we explore by viewing the 
arbitrageur as the ideal typical personality characteristic of it. We will argue that, 
while arbitrage can be seen as a single-minded means of pursuing profit that raises 
important issues of trust and ethics, it can also be understood to contain an exemplary 
approach towards managing the unknown via a creative commitment to overcoming 
economic and human limits. It is this characteristic that illuminates the radical 
differences separating contemporary financial decision-making from earlier economic 
practices. 
 
The Capitalist Ethos of Uncertainty  
How can Weber’s analyses, written over a century ago, possibly help us understand 
the current global ‘explosion’ in financial leveraging, speculation, tools of ‘opaque 
complexity’, and forms of trading ‘almost completely removed from other forms of 
property, capital, and assets’ (Appadurai, 2012: 4)? In answering this question, it is 
first worth pointing out that various theorists have found Weber useful in analogous 
ways. Castells (1996: 163-6, 193, 199), for example, argues that a clear ethos remains 
evident in capitalism even if its contemporary spirit no longer reflects the hierarchical 
and bureaucratic models of earlier periods. For Castells, exploring Weber’s spirit of 
capitalism enables us to see how this ethos has morphed into a new ‘spirit of 
informationalism’ that has as its organisational expression de-centralised, self-
directed units of entrepreneurial flexibility. Co-ordinated across a multiplicity of 
financialised contexts, these units develop multiple rational strategies in order to 
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gather the information necessary to minimise the risks of working within volatile 
global markets (for related analyses, see Sennett, 2006: 3, 16; Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2005: 107).   
Developing this engagement with Weberian themes, Knight’s (2006: 19-20) 
analysis has important implications for examining the capacity of these flexible, 
information-collecting responses to cope not only with increased risk but also with the 
growing, and in our view crucial, problem of uncertainty in the contemporary era. For 
Knight, risk pertains to phenomena ‘susceptible of measurement’, suggesting the 
calculable environments of Weber’s account of early modern rational capitalism. 
Uncertainty, in contrast, refers to matters immeasurable and is dealt with by Weber’s 
writings on why Calvinist entrepreneurs immersed themselves in worldly activity.  
Knight’s argument develops by addressing the changing nature of capitalism 
in the early 20th century, and suggests that, while the strategies of corporations 
identified by Castells and others are well placed to respond to economic risks, the 
problems and opportunities associated with uncertainty can never be managed by 
plans addressed purely towards calculable probabilities (Lee, 2013: 64). Uncertainty 
had already become so central to financial capital, even a century ago, that it 
demanded a qualitatively new approach from those seeking to flourish within this 
changed economic ethos.  
Exploring further how contemporary corporations and enterprises do now seek 
to cope with the unknown, Appadurai (2012) suggests there has been a reversal of the 
relationship between rational risk and uncertainty mapped out in the Protestant Ethic 
thesis. For Weber, the past Calvinist confrontation with uncertainty was confined to 
the issue of other-worldly salvation evident in the doctrine of pre-destination (a 
doctrine that held individuals could not know whether they were saved or damned). 
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Believers sought to cope with this uncertainty by immersing themselves in the 
knowable realm of rational, albeit risky, worldly activity; activity that helped give rise 
to rational capitalism. In this context, while uncertainty about salvation remained, 
diversion could be had through immersing the self within the calculable sphere of 
commercial activities. Prices, margins, exchanges and profits could all be recorded, 
assessed and evaluated, providing the conscientious entrepreneur with a sense of 
control that came from deploying rational strategies in dealing with market-based 
risks.  
In the present era of financialised capitalism, however, Appadurai (2012: 9) 
suggests that instead of this-worldly rationality compensating for other-worldly 
(salvation) uncertainty, the huge growth of uncertainty within the economy has 
prompted individuals to adopt what is essentially a religious belief in capitalism 
manifest via a ‘general, absolute, and apparently transcendent faith in the market’ 
(Appadurai, 2012: 9). Weber’s rational secularising spirit of capitalism has for 
Appadurai (2012: 5-6) – as well as for several other analysts - given way ‘to an 
entirely different spirit in which finance has become a magical space’, characterised 
by an irrational ‘market fundamentalism’ (Ehrenreich, 2009:191; Stiglitz, 2009: 346-
7, 353; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2001: 25).  
The idea that there has been a ‘religious reversal’ of the relationship between 
capitalism and secularisation is a provocative way of developing Weber’s writings, 
but overlooks one of their key features. Appadurai’s (2012: 8) claim that financialised 
capitalism is associated with renewed faith rests on similarities between today’s Wall 
Street traders and the ‘charismatic confidence of Calvin himself (in his certainty of 
grace and thus in his endorsement of the organisation of all of life to the glory of 
God)’. What this ignores is Weber’s observation that on-going uncertainty, caused by 
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the doctrine of predestination and manifest via salvation anxiety, motivated Calvin’s 
followers to persist in a sustained engagement with rational work. Uncertainty was 
not banished by immersion in economic action, but provided a deep backdrop to all 
their activities. Downplaying the significance of uncertainty, as Appadurai does, also 
crucially ignores its growing role in the contemporary generation of profit.  
In contrast, Knight (2006: lxii, 18) holds that rational engagements with risk 
can only go so far in the pursuit of profit, since increasingly effective calculative 
decision-making within competitive markets leads eventually to the elimination of 
profit as money costs equate ever more closely to selling prices. For him, it is 
increasingly in the sphere of the unknowns and unforeseeables that financial surpluses 
are generated. This point is crucial, and we build on it by suggesting that while 
rational decision-making still has an important role in generating profits, and in the 
work involved in arbitrage, it is nevertheless the case that arbitrageurs operate in a 
situation of Knightian uncertainty. What we mean by this is that they seek to secure 
profits through an interpretive, reflexive and theory-driven process expressive of the 
speculative, future-oriented engagement with uncertainty that is the defining 
movement of financial capital today (Rose, 2007a: 31, 48). As Lee (2013: 63) 
suggests, the uncertainty Weber indicated motivated Calvinist involvement in 
enterprise should be now seen as a ‘a fundamental premise and structuring principle’ 
of capitalism, evident in new forms of ‘decision-making under uncertainty’. These 
forms move beyond the instrumental rationalisation of early modern capitalism in 
their pursuit of profit (requiring theoretically innovative and creative rather than 
merely rational and calculative approaches), without returning to religion or magic.  
Our analysis has thus far focused on the relationship between risk and 
uncertainty, and a potential shift towards the importance of the latter, as an initial step 
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in identifying the ethos of contemporary capitalism. This approach can now be 
developed by exploring how a certain type of personality, the arbitrageur, may 
embody a creative approach to exploiting uncertainty in a particular orientation to 
what Weber (1992: 71-2), with reference to an earlier type of capitalist entrepreneur, 
called the singular ‘devotion to the calling of making money’.  
 
Arbitrage, the ‘Worldly Calling of Money’ and Personality  
The worldly calling to make money in early modern capitalism was for Weber 
exemplified by the personality of the (Puritan) entrepreneur. Rational action as well as 
worldly asceticism was central to this figure, but Weber also recognised that the 
intensive profit-driven individualism and commitment to innovation exhibited by 
early modern entrepreneurs was such that they sometimes exhibited ‘immunity from 
the ubiquitous drive for bureaucratic rule’ (Ebner, 2005: 262-3; Finch, 2007). While 
Weber depicted modernity as an ‘iron cage’ of rationalisation, then, his conception of 
the spirit of capitalism embodied within these personalities acknowledged Simmel’s 
concern with how life involves a constant ‘reaching beyond’ current boundaries into 
circumstances marked by uncertainty.  It is this dimension of Weber’s work that is 
echoed in Merton’s (1965) argument that ‘innovation’ rather than rationally adaptive 
action constitutes a positive and creative response to the uncertainties associated with 
capitalism (Deutschmann, 2011: 373.) 
Weber’s suggestion that it takes a particular type of personality to respond to 
the calling embedded within early modern capitalism has been reiterated in the 
changed circumstances of the current era. It is implicit in Castells’s (1996: 198) 
account of how the dissolution of large corporations into webs of multidirectional 
networks requires informational entrepreneurs capable of identifying and exploiting 
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opportunities for the advance of their interests. Sennett (2006: 3) also argues that 
‘only a certain kind of person’, adaptable and at ease with change, can prosper in the 
new capitalism, while Boltanski and Chiapello (2005: 107) identify the ‘connexionist’ 
(a personality characterised by innovation, networking and entrepreneurship) as the 
exemplar of contemporary change (see also du Gay and Morgan, 2013; Cooper, 2008: 
34). Against this background, it becomes interesting to ask what characteristics typify 
the arbitrageur, the individual who perhaps most obviously embodies the singular 
devotion to the calling of making money in the current era. 
There is broad general acknowledgement that arbitrage today is a highly 
complex, technically demanding form of trading and ‘the preserve of an elite group of 
market professionals’ (Beunza, Hardie and MacKenzie, 2006: 735, 722), though the 
economic literature on the subject expresses inconsistent understandings of what it 
involves (Hardie, 2004: 239-40; see Lilley and Lightfoot, 2014; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). In what follows, drawing on a range of ethnographically and empirically-
informed studies of arbitrageurs, we highlight their ideal typical characteristics, 
focusing on their orientation to innovation, their reflexive engagement with 
uncertainty and their ‘what if’ future-orientedness. 
It is important to note that not all analysts agree with the suggestion that 
arbitrageurs display an orientation to innovation. Hardie (2004: 240, 242), for one, 
denies this, returning instead to the standard financial textbook vision of arbitrageurs 
as traders seeking to exploit the ‘mispricing’ of assets across markets (the price of 
anything being the ‘equilibrium point’ of supply and demand), thus seeing them as 
performing an essentially rationalising rather than innovative role with regard to 
market ‘inefficiencies’ (MacKenzie, 2003: 349). This accords with Hull’s (1997: 10-
12) distinction between three types of derivatives traders: hedgers, who try to limit 
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exposure to risks they already face; speculators, who bet on whether prices will go up 
or down; and arbitrageurs, who seek ‘riskless profit by entering simultaneously into 
transactions in two or more markets’. While Hardie argues that only the latter should 
properly be called ‘arbitrage’, however, a number of influential analyses of arbitrage 
make it clear that this is certainly not how it is understood and practiced by 
arbitrageurs today. 
MacKenzie (2003: 353) and Beunza and Stark (2004: 374), for example, stress 
that ‘real-world’ arbitrage involves a great deal of risk, most notably exposure to 
substantial losses. Miyazaki’s (2007: 401) ethnographic study of Japanese derivatives 
traders reinforces this further: ‘No trader I knew actually believed that their arbitrage 
operations were risk free’. While Miyazaki acknowledges that something akin to 
Hull’s distinction between arbitrageurs and speculators was important for how these 
traders conceptualised their own activity – all of them refuted the suggestion that they 
were engaged in speculation – he also notes that, in practice, this was not clear cut at 
all. Rather, the distinction between arbitrage and speculation served as ‘an important 
marker of their particular epistemological stance, identity and ethical commitment’; a 
marker that elevated arbitrage to a sort of calling, albeit one expressive of the 
ambiguity of arbitrage, not least with regard to risk (Miyazaki, 2007: 407).  
This ambiguous relationship to risk is central to those ethnographic studies 
that emphasise the inherently innovative orientation of arbitrageurs. Just as Knight 
(2006) stressed that entrepreneurs cannot simply exploit already existing opportunities 
for profit in a rational marketplace but must also create them, so too arbitrageurs 
today construct and calibrate unexpected associations between assets to facilitate 
profit in an experimental, theory-driven process (Beunza and Stark, 2005: 86; Beunza, 
Hardie and MacKenzie, 2006: 733; Finch, 2007: 134; Miyazaki, 2013: 8). Here, rather 
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than being risk-averse correctors of irrational ‘mispricing’, arbitrageurs ‘operate in an 
environment of Knightian uncertainty’ (Beunza and Stark, 2007). Risk is an inherent 
component of most acts of arbitrage, and arbitrageurs seek to manage it, but the key 
characteristic of their pursuit of a profit is the creative leveraging of opportunities 
emergent from uncertainty rather than the exploitation of gaps in other traders’ 
knowledge. This is not to underplay the significance of knowledge. As Beunza and 
Stark (2002) note, the vast array of information available to Wall Street arbitrageurs 
today, displayed on the walls of flat screens in front of them in their trading rooms, is 
vital for helping them make sense of informational patterns (e.g. matching data to 
models, making associations). Nevertheless, Beunza and Stark (2002) also quote Jon 
Corzine, then-CEO of Goldman Sachs, noting that, today, ‘No one really generates a 
long-term competitive edge just because they know something that someone else 
doesn’t’. For them, arbitrageurs exploit knowledge but they are also explorers, 
engaged in the kind of ‘search where you don’t know what you’re looking for but will 
recognise it when you find it’ (Beunza and Stark, 2002: 5). 
Thus, contrary to ethnographies of trading rooms that depict them as either 
hyper-rational information gathering centres or emotionally charged bear-pits (Lilley 
and Lightfoot, 2014: 86; see Zaloom, 2006; Ho, 2009), Beunza and Stark’s analyses 
foreground arbitrageurs’ balancing of risk management with the creative generation 
of profit through a reflexive engagement with uncertainty. Arbitrageurs 
characteristically ‘slice and dice’ their exposure to companies (thus managing risk), 
but do so through a creative disassociation of stocks and properties from each other. 
This is not about breaking a company up into different, more or less profitable 
divisions, as corporate traders do, but determining its different properties, and then 
positing associations, which can be reinforced by various forms of hedging, and using 
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of instruments such as derivatives, options, and futures. A trade involving a company 
such as Boeing, for example, might here disaggregate it (on the basis of theoretically 
driven judgments about uncertain future trends) into a technological, aviation, 
consumer travel or American stock, facilitating a very broad range of potential 
associations with other companies, or elements of companies, with ‘similar’ 
properties, such as Microsoft, Northrop, Disney or the S&P 500 index (Beunza and 
Stark, 2004: 376). As a creative engagement with ‘heterogeneity, ambiguity and path 
variety’ (Ailon, 2011: 141-3), arbitrage is in this account attuned to what Soros (2009) 
calls the new ‘paradigm of reflexivity’ now shaping financial markets rather than the 
‘old paradigm’ of equilibrium.  
It is not that the rational management of risk becomes unimportant, then, but, 
rather, that arbitrage characteristically embodies a reflexive, interpretive and, in the 
face of uncertainty, bold trading strategy: for all the ‘trimmings, hedging, and cutting, 
this is not a trading strategy for the faint of heart’ (Beunza and Stark: 2004: 17). The 
broader cultural significance of this focus is suggested by its parallels with accounts 
of the relationship between financial investment and the ‘spirit of biocapital’, and the 
affinities that exist between neo-liberal economics, arbitrage and current 
developments in the life sciences and bio-tech industries. These suggest that we now 
exist within an innovation based economy where elements of life itself can be 
disaggregated, reconstructed and subject to capitalisation via future-oriented genetic, 
microbial and cellular interventions (Rose, 2007a: 31, 40, 52, 48; 2007b; Cooper, 
2008: 17-18, 13, 19, 24). Such developments recall Marx’s suggestion that the ‘drive 
to overcome limits and relocate in the speculative future is the defining movement of 
[financial] capital’ (Rose, 2007a: 31, 48; Cooper, 2008: 17-18, 13, 19), as does 
arbitrageurs’ meta-reflexive approach to the world open to the profitable possibilities 
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that inhere within uncertainty (Miyazaki, 2013: 151). These characteristically centre 
around ‘what if’ questions, as can be seen in the example of ‘merger arbitrage’.  
As Beunza and Stark (2004: 377) explain, merger arbitrage can happen at the 
point when two companies announce their intention to merge. Instead of involving a 
rational assessment of the pros and cons of these interests merging on a basis 
approximating to their current composition, however, arbitrageurs often ask ‘what if’ 
questions based on uncertain predictions about the combination and re-constitution of 
only limited aspects of their business. Excluding from these ‘what if’ equations those 
elements of the businesses they have no interest in, arbitrageurs may here engage in 
trades that ‘long’ the index for these undesirable properties (placing their significance 
into the uncertain future) and look to realise swifter profits on associations they make 
between other elements of the companies in relation to other stocks in other markets. 
Such an approach does not just involve reflecting on the distinctive elements of 
companies, but also entails a form of reflexivity enacted in relation to the wider 
market possibilities they raise. 
Going beyond the parameters of rational action, then, the work of arbitrageurs 
is directed toward breaking down ‘the continuities between past, present and future 
trades by dismantling narratives of success or failure’, in an economy of information 
and speed, where they have to be adept at pattern-recognition and re-cognition, 
reconceptualising situations and making novel and previously unanticipated 
associations (Beunza and Stark, 2004: 369, 372-3; Zaloom, 2006: 128; Lilley and 
Lightfoot, 2014: 79). It is this ‘creative destruction’ that makes differences and 
similarities relative and theory-dependent, allowing arbitrage to be extended to 
virtually anything (Miyazaki, 2013: 8). 
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Arbitrage and Doubled Existence 
Suggesting that the ideal-type personality and activities of arbitrageurs have at their 
core a meta-reflexivity in relation to uncertainty has implications not only for how 
these individuals navigate financial markets, but also for how they relate to other 
people. Indeed, for commentators such as Stiglitz (2009), arbitrageurs constitute a 
new and dangerous class of the financial elite, able to operate outside the parameters 
that constrain other members of society, and possessed of the capacity to destabilise 
national and international economies. Weber’s (1992) emphasis on the robust 
individualism of the capitalist entrepreneur, and its disruptive consequences for 
established social and cultural orders, is of note here, as is Simmel’s (1971) 
association of modern individualism with multiple ‘doubled existences’, wherein 
individuals are never fully embedded within one social group, but tend towards 
multiple, time-limited and conditional connections with others.  
 In looking to identify the particular ethic that underpins arbitrage in Japan, 
Miyazaki (2007: 406) talks of such ‘doubledness’, while, with reference to Wall 
Street, Beunza and Stark (2002: 13) identify arbitrageurs’ ‘competitive’ and ‘fiercely 
individualistic’ characteristics. Quoting a trading room manager’s depiction of 
arbitrageurs as ‘anti-social’, however, they also imply that the way in which a trading 
room is organised suggests a more ‘doubled’ form of existence. Successful trading 
rooms require an interactive sharing and testing of ideas, so arbitrageurs are grouped 
in ways that facilitate this; on the other hand, they are moved around frequently, so 
they do not become too settled into particular groups – only the trading room manager 
remains in one place, at the centre of the room (Beunza and Stark, 2002: 14).  
This to some degree calls into question MacKenzie’s (2003: 371, 373) 
emphasis on what he sees as the potentially strong social links between arbitrageurs. 
  17 
Focusing on how arbitrageurs are influenced by ‘slim’ and exclusive interpersonal 
networks of their own kind (Granovetter, 1985), he highlights how the information 
exchanged within these networks can prompt extreme price movements and the 
possibility of ‘arbitrage flight’, where the selling off of assets creates panic and 
potential financial crises impacting on wider communities (see also Knorr Cetina and 
Bruegger, 2002: 907). From this perspective, arbitrage is an inherently ‘social’ thing, 
even if associations between arbitrageurs are potentially free of the constraints of 
wider societal norms (Beunza, Hardie and MacKenzie, 2006: 739, 742). This 
depiction is challenged, however, by Callon’s (1998: 2) argument that arbitrageurs are 
disembedded from even slim social networks as well as from wider societal norms as 
a consequence of their work distancing them from stable social and cultural forms 
(Arminen, 2010: 171-4; Preda, 2009). 
Developing Callon’s account, Beunza and Stark (2004: 396-7) suggest 
arbitrageurs ‘perform’ their trades through a reflexive awareness of the key role of 
their own innovation in recursively-constructed financial markets. Arbitrage here 
entails a ‘reflexive social distancing’ from other arbitrageurs, from those involved in 
producing the goods and services that are traded, and from the wider social, economic 
and political consequences of such trades (Ailon, 2014: 615-16). This is aided by the 
technical properties of digital networks: transactions within financial markets utilise 
technologies characterised by interconnectivity, simultaneity, and decentralised 
access, facilitating the multiplication of fast-changing transactions, a lengthening of 
transaction chains (i.e. the distance between instrument and underlying asset), and an 
increase in the number of participants involved in trades (Sassen, 2005: 18; Beunza 
and Stark, 2004). It is also aided by the heterarchical organisational settings within 
trading rooms, which mitigate against arbitrageurs being drawn into forms of sociality 
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that might compromise reflexivity as a key ‘tool of the trade’ (Beunza and Stark, 
2005: 89; 2004). 
The reflexive management of trust in the trading room is also indicative of the 
limits of arbitrageurs’ social embeddedness, and further evidence of their ‘doubled 
existences’. Trust is needed when an arbitrage position looks set to yield losses that 
will turn into subsequent profit only if the theory underpinning it is correct (Beunza, 
Hardie and MacKenzie, 2006: 722). While in trading circles it is said that the ‘white 
sheet’ (profit and loss statistics) does not lie, the arbitrageur may make the judgement 
it does (at least for the time being). In such cases, the trust required by arbitrageurs is 
neither automatic (managers frequently force arbitrageurs to abandon a position at this 
point), rational (it is a matter of interpretation rather than simple calculation), or a 
matter of a reciprocal relation (trust is given on the basis of a conditional assessment 
of an arbitrageur’s particular interpretive capacities and the underpinning theory, 
rather than reflecting an underlying sociality) (Beunza, Hardie and MacKenzie, 2006: 
734-5). If trust within the trading room is conditional in the face of uncertainty, 
however, outside it arbitrageurs’ doubled existences generate notable distrust and 
accusations that the contemporary capitalist ethos of uncertainty is harnessed to 
unethical practices. 
 
Arbitrage and Ethics 
We have already noted that many of the ills of financialisation have been attributed 
specifically to arbitrage (Stiglitz, 2009: 346-7, 353; Archer, 2012: 35; Farlow, 2013). 
Widen’s (2012) account of the ‘arbitrage of truth’ in reference to phenomena such as 
Greece’s utilisation of derivatives and other sophisticated financial products to mask 
the extent of its financial obligations, in collusion with Wall Street, is representative 
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of such interpretations. ‘Arbitrage’ here becomes a label for financial activity that is 
technically legal but inherently fraudulent, thereby making arbitrageurs the yardstick 
for all that is judged ‘unethical’ about contemporary financialisation. 
Harrington’s (2012) sociological account of a wide range of types of fraud and 
its perpetrators helps highlight the inappropriateness of such claims, not least in her 
focus on the highly instrumental nature of fraud, which utilises deceit with the intent 
of obtaining monies under false pretences (see also Tade and Aliyu, 2011; Baker and 
Faulkner, 2004: 92). Certain types of fraud may indeed be facilitated by instruments 
that are now central to financialised capitalism (Lapavitsas, 2011; Bryan and Rafferty, 
2014), but this does not mean that the calculations and actions specific to arbitrage 
can be classified in this way (individuals may pose fraudulently as arbitrageurs but 
that is another matter).  
In pursuing the issue of arbitrage and ethics further, however, it is useful to 
revisit Weber once more in terms of the ideal typical distinctions he draws between 
the (Puritan) entrepreneur, and the ‘unscrupulous speculators’ that exist at all periods 
of economic history (Preda, 2009). Weber’s depiction of entrepreneurs emphasises 
their conscientious approach towards business based upon honesty and the pursuit of 
profit. As speculators whose creation and use of complex financial instruments has 
been accused of distorting markets, arbitrageurs appear to stand in stark opposition to 
this model entrepreneur (Stiglitz, 2009: 353; Knorr Cetina and Preda, 2005: 3). Even 
if arbitrageurs do not engage in a fraudulent acquisition of resources, then, this 
distinction might be taken to suggest that they could be identified as an undesirable 
element of an increasingly abstract capitalism. Indeed, Merton’s (1965) association of 
innovation under conditions of uncertainty with actions at the verge of the law might 
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seem to apply to arbitrageurs, particularly in the context of their reflexive social 
distancing from wider norms and groups.  
Having made this point, however, it is important to note that Weber’s 
conception of ‘ethics’ – explored in relation to the Puritan entrepreneur as well as in 
relation to such issues as the vocation of politics – does not refer to issues of ‘right 
and wrong, of deceit or transparency, of honesty or probity’ (Appadurai, 2012:7). 
Instead, it signals a systematic co-ordination of action in relation to a deeply held 
commitment. This is something evident in many specific acts of arbitrage: despite the 
fact that arbitrage may reflect emotional detachment from a particular trade, and 
embody a social distancing from its broader human context, that trade only becomes 
possible because of a strong attachment to the evaluative principle that makes it an 
opportunity for profit: ‘to be opportunistic you must be committed to a principle’ 
(Beunza and Stark: 2004: 7). Beyond specific trades, nonetheless, arbitrage takes on a 
broader ethical quality. 
Here, we can note Miyazaki’s (2013: 110) emphasis on how the Japanese 
arbitrageurs he studied had such a faith in arbitrage that they routinely deployed it 
systematically to all areas of their lives, as in the case of an arbitrageur who saw ‘life 
decisions such as marriage and career options as arbitrageable’. The application of 
arbitrage even to intimate relations such as marriage suggests a thoroughgoing 
reflexive social distancing, which was also extended to matters of spirituality. Many 
of these arbitrageurs explored religious traditions as diverse as Christianity and Zen 
Buddhism, with their engagements shaped by the ambiguity and relativism that 
permeated their practice of arbitrage (Miyazaki, 213: 123-5). Contrary to Appadurai’s 
(2012) claim for a ‘religious reversal’ of Weber’s vision relationship between 
capitalism and secularisation, spirituality, like everything else, becomes arbitrageable.  
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Indeed, what Miyazaki (2013) calls the ‘seemingly infinite extensibility’ of the 
relativist and comparative perspective of arbitrage helps account for its broader usage 
in contemporary capitalist cultures: the notion of ‘arbitrage’ here may be far removed 
from the actual practice of arbitrageurs, but its utilisation signals a resonance with 
perceptions of an underlying ethos specific to financialised capitalism. In this context, 
arbitrage may be viewed at its most general as the utilisation of innovation, reflexivity 
and ethical relativism – apparent within but also outside financial transactions – in 
order to negotiate multiple ‘doubled existences’ in conditions of Knightian 
uncertainty (Miyazaki, 2013: 8; Weber, 1992: 71-2; Simmel, 1971). Here, 
Seabrooke’s (2014) deployment of the notion of ‘arbitrage’ to capture transnational 
professionals’ strategic negotiation of identities across diverse social groupings takes 
it even further away from the actual financial practices of arbitrageurs, but it 
nonetheless captures the reflexive and relativist management of uncertainty central to 
it as an ethic. 
 
Conclusion 
We began by noting the widespread recognition of the importance of financialisation 
within mature capitalist economies, and its prototypical embodiment in arbitrage as a 
form of trading attuned to the creative exploitation of opportunities for profit via the 
utilisation of financial tools in ways increasingly abstracted from the tangible assets 
of the productive economy. Challenging the relative lack of attention to the cultural 
dimensions of these developments, we suggested that the arbitrageur can be 
understood to embody a new ethos of uncertainty that has become central to 
financialised capitalism. Relatedly, we also argued that this figure exemplifies the 
issues of ethics and innovation raised by those who now personify what Weber 
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(1992), with reference to an earlier ideal typical representation of the capitalist 
entrepreneur, called the ‘devotion to the calling of making money’.  
In so doing we have not sought to minimise the importance of those structural 
transformations of capitalist economies that tend to dominate assessments of 
financialisation, but to utilise the identification of the arbitrageur as a contemporary 
analogue to Weber’s earlier ideal type as a way of casting fresh light on how cultural 
and structural transformations can combine to facilitate new patterns of decision-
making in financial markets. These patterns cannot be reduced to simple narratives of 
the greed, deceit and predation of ‘casino capitalism’, but, rather, they reflect a 
particular ethical engagement with the increased opportunity structures characteristic 
of contemporary life.  
Indeed, the practice of arbitrage provides an interesting route into questions 
about the fate of ethics in the current era. The very way in which arbitrageurs 
‘perform’ economics operates through a meta-reflexive perspective on forging 
opportunities for profit while traversing forms, networks and transaction chains. 
Distanced as it is from social values or groups, this suggests there is an ethical 
relativism underpinning arbitrage, rendering everything ‘arbitrary’, since the different 
evaluative devices arbitrageurs utilise for financial gain can be applied to the 
uncertainties and opportunities of life more broadly (Miyazaki, 2013: 38, 63; Beunza 
and Stark, 2005: 87). Here, arbitrage is more than a trading strategy, and suggestive of 
‘a principle of capitalism, of life, and even of mind’ within the ‘new telos of creative 
uncertainty’ (Miyazaki, 2013: 38,1; O’Malley, 2004: 174). From this point of view, 
the arbitrageur cannot embody the scrupulous honesty of Weber’s entrepreneur, but 
does represent an analogous embrace of uncertainty via a worldly ethic. 
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This worldly ethic can, indeed, be associated with the future-oriented, 
speculative ambition to overcome limits evident within a broader ‘bioeonomics’ 
where all life’s possibilities are open to conjecture and capitalisation (Rose, 2007a; 
Cooper, 2008; Lilley and Papadopolous, 2010). It can also be linked to Marx’s (1974) 
argument that economic activity offers humans the chance to add to the social forms 
or dimensions in which they exist rather than being confined purely to the ‘realm of 
necessity’ (see Marx and Engels, 1970: 48-9). So too, albeit from a very different 
perspective, it can be linked to Simmel’s (1990) observation that the money economy, 
irrespective of its limitations, enables individuals to liberate themselves from 
traditional ties and participate in forms of life that could not even have existed in the 
pre-modern era. As such, while the arbitrageur’s calling speaks directly to the 
transformations of contemporary financialised capitalism, it also resonates with the 
broader transformational possibilities long held to be central to modern economic life. 
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